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The Binding Charter Ten Years On: More than a ‘Mere Entreaty’? 
Dr Eleni Frantziou* 
 
I. Introduction  
 
In his seminal Opinion in Bauer, the late Advocate General Bot argued that fundamental 
rights listed in the Charter should have a proper bite – that they are not, as he put it, ‘une 
simple incantation’ – or ‘a mere entreaty’.1 This formulation becomes a useful prompt for 
framing this article, which seeks to cast a retrospective glance at the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, as it captures two key changes the binding Charter has effected upon 
fundamental rights protection in the European Union.2  
 
First, this phrase conjures up the irony of the Charter’s history, emerging through the Treaty 
of Nice precisely as a ‘simple incantation’. The attribution of ‘the same legal status as the 
Treaties’3 to this instrument as part of the Lisbon reforms ten years ago followed a nearly 
decade-long period of initial flirtation with the Charter in its non-binding dimension. 
Neither the Charter’s text nor its overall character as confirmatory of ‘existing rights’4 
changed with the attribution of binding effect thereto. And yet, the symbolic effects of 
formal constitutionalisation are, as the informed reader might already be able to remark, 
discernible in the way in which the Charter has been used in the case law after 2009. Still, 
the question of whether fundamental rights are ‘more than a mere entreaty’ can be 
approached in another sense, too: whereas the Charter as a constitutional instrument may 
be well recognised and extensively relied upon, can this be said of all of its provisions? 
That question was, indeed, at the heart of the Advocate General’s reasoning in Bauer: he 
was concerned not with whether the Charter as a whole was effective, but with whether a 
particular subset of Charter rights – fundamental social rights – could be considered as 
anything more than a mere entreaty within the Charter. 
 
The following discussion of the Charter’s first decade as a binding instrument will be 
guided by this twofold schema. It interrogates, firstly, the Charter’s overall effectiveness 
as a binding instrument. Secondly, it looks more specifically at the effective application of 
the rights protected therein. In order to carry out this assessment, the first substantive part 
of the paper lays down and decodes a series of data – some drawn from official documents 
and some originally collected for present purposes – regarding the use of the Charter in the 
case law of the Court of Justice to date (Section II). Interpreting this statistical information 
leads to two initial findings: that whereas the Charter has become an essential port of call 
for human rights discourse in the EU, there are significant variations in the extent to which 
it has affected the different sets of provisions enshrined in its seven titles. While, in part, 
this may be explained by external factors, such as the lack of EU competences or of 
relevance for the scope of EU law in certain areas of rights protection, it justifies a closer 
                                                     
* I am grateful to Professor Robert Schuetze and the anonymous comments received during peer review for 
an extremely constructive input. Any errors remain, of course, mine alone.  
1 Opinion of Advocate General Bot, delivered on 29 May 2018, in Joined Cases C-569/16, Bauer and 
Willmeroth, EU:C:2018:337, para 95, citing R Tinière, ‘L’invocabilité des principes de la Charte des droits 
fondamentaux dans les litiges horizontaux’ Revue des droits et libertés fondamentaux (2014) Chronicle No 
14. 
2 For the purposes of this paper, the terms fundamental and human rights are used interchangeably.  
3 Article 6(1) TEU. 
4 House of Lords EU Select Committee, ‘The Treaty of Lisbon: An Impact Assessment’ (HL Paper 62, 
August 2007) paras 5.37–5.41.  
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look and an attempt to theorise potential difficulties in the adjudication of certain rights or 
types of rights within the European Union. 
 
That is the purpose of the second substantive section of the paper (Section III), which seeks 
to contextualise the numerical data so as to offer an overarching interpretation of the two 
questions set out above. On the one hand, it will be argued, the Charter has succeeded in 
relatively quickly weaving into EU law a bill of rights – one of the clearest affirmations of 
an ‘ever closer Union’ of EU citizens or, differently put, of a legal order that creates ‘rights 
which become part of their legal heritage’, to recall the famous paragraph from Van Gend 
en Loos.5 Yet, on the other hand, despite certain efforts to affirm the constitutional character 
of all of its provisions,6 the case law on the Charter arguably continues to embed two of the 
Union’s core limitations in the field of fundamental rights protection, which largely explain 
the varied treatment of its different titles. The first of these limitations is none other than 
the Court’s construction of rights as prerogatives to be asserted by each interested 
individual against others – already clear in the above passage from the Van Gend en Loos 
ruling.7 The second, albeit related, limitation resides in an attempt to translate to the Charter 
the idea of balancing the Union’s ‘double aim, at once economic and social’8 – a notion 
which can tilt the way in which some of the rights protected particularly in the Freedoms 
and Solidarity titles operate.  
 
There is no magic potion for these problems in the Union’s fundamental rights 
jurisprudence. Rather, as this paper ultimately argues (Section IV), moving toward a more 
mature period of rights protection through the Charter requires a conscious break with the 
aforementioned aspects of the Union’s pre-existing conception of fundamental rights, as 
well as a deeper engagement with the sources of human rights protection on which the 
Charter itself is based. Such engagement could more explicitly involve the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the ICCPR, the ICESR, the ESC and, most importantly, the 
Convention, as well as the theories of interpretation that underpin inter- or post-national 
human rights. More concretely, three tenets of human rights theory can, in my view, be 
valuable in developing a coherent, rather than a fragmented, right-by-right or even case-
by-case view of the Charter within EU law: the tripartite typology of rights; a more 
complete principle of attribution that differentiates right-holders from duty-bearers; and the 
notion of incommensurability of human rights with respect to other interests.  
 
II. Data on the use of the Charter in Court of Justice Case Law  
 
Numerical data does not always offer a reliable measure of the success of a human rights 
instrument. However, it can be a useful starting point for identifying patterns and possible 
gaps over a stretch of time. It is in this way that some statistical information relating to the 
use of the Charter will be used, so as to shed light upon the two different aspects of this 
enquiry: whether the Charter has structurally changed fundamental rights discourse in the 
European Union and whether it has changed the treatment in EU law of particular human 
rights. These issues will be discussed in turn, following a note on the nature and limitations 
                                                     
5 Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 1, 12. 
6 See, notably, the rejection of the idea that the Charter had introduced an opt-out from Solidarity provisions 
in Joined Cases C-411-10 and C-493-10, N.S. and M.E., EU:C:2011:865, paras 118-120. 
7 See further, on this point, JHH Weiler, ‘The Individual as Subject and Object and the Dilemma of 
European Legitimacy’ (2014) 12:1 ICON 94. 
8  Case 43/75, Defrenne 1976 ECR 455, para 12. 
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of the data presented herein as well as a detailed disclosure of my methodology during the 
data collection stage. 
 
A. Qualities and Limitations of the Data Presented 
 
It should be noted at the outset that, as this paper focuses predominantly on the use of the 
Charter by the Court of Justice, it does not – except tangentially – rely upon data concerning 
national courts. Equally, as the purpose of the paper is to assess the impact of the 
application of the Charter on the case law, it excludes judgments by the General Court and 
the Civil Service Tribunal.9 It excludes the Opinions of Advocates General insofar as it 
refers to ‘rulings’ or ‘judgments’, but includes them where it refers to ‘mentions.’10  
 
The data relied upon is drawn from four main sources: the European Commission’s Annual 
Reports on the Application of the Charter (2010-2018);11 the Fundamental Rights Agency’s 
(hereafter ‘FRA’) data on the Charter, through its Fundamental Rights Report 2019;12 
original data collected from the Court’s case law database through term-specific searches 
for each Charter provision;13 and, finally, the FRA’s database on right-by-right references 
to the Charter (‘Charterpedia’).14 
 
The Commission’s reports and the Annual Report of the FRA provide statistics on the 
application of the Charter since 2010, thus highlighting broad patterns and trends regarding 
its use. However, they are based on sampling and offer neither complete right-by-right data 
(other than an indication of the most frequently relied upon provisions of the Charter) nor 
a comparison with the pre-Lisbon Charter.  
 
My own data will be used to fill the gaps left by these official statistics,15 by indicating 
broad overall trends about the post-Lisbon Charter and the use of particular provisions and 
                                                     
9 My reasoning for this was that including these judgments would carry the risk of skewing results in favour 
of specific provisions, such as the rights of defence, which would be more likely to be invoked in case law 
in which the General Court acts as the first instance court, whereas relying solely on the case law of the 
Court of Justice can offer a more reliable picture of the use of the Charter as a whole.  
10 My reasoning for separating mentions in Opinions from my findings concerning Court of Justice case law 
was twofold: first, as highlighted in the text, it was intended to help with clarifying the extent to which the 
Charter has had an impact on the application of fundamental rights through binding rulings, rather than 
influencing their application, particularly considering the extensive use of the Charter by Advocates 
General already as a non-binding instrument before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. Secondly, it 
was intended to ensure consistency with the data of the European Commission at n 11 below, which refer to 
‘rulings’, so that comparisons can be made between these datasets. Nevertheless, I have included Opinions 
alongside preliminary ruling requests in my discussion of ‘mentions’ and ‘distinct case references’.     
11 European Commission, ‘Annual Reports on the Application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
2010-2018’, available at https://ec.europa.eu/info/aid-development-cooperation-fundamental-rights/your-
rights-eu/eu-charter-fundamental-rights/application-charter/annual-reports-application-charter_en, accessed 
15 August 2019 (hereafter ‘Commission Report [year]’). 
12 Fundamental Rights Agency, ‘Fundamental Rights Report 2019’, available at 
https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2019-fundamental-rights-report-2019_en.pdf , 
accessed 15 August 2019. 
13 The original data is supplied as an Annex to this issue.  
14 Fundamental Rights Agency, ‘Charterpedia’ database, available at ttps://fra.europa.eu/en/charterpedia, 
accessed 15 August 2019. 
15 It should be acknowledged, in this regard, that while care has been taken to collect the same data, as 
noted earlier, the methodology of the Commission and FRA is not laid down in detail in their respective 
analyses. This means that different collection methodologies could result in potential reconciliation issues. 
However, as the data is used only to highlight broad trends, rather than to draw detailed conclusions, I feel 
that this does not present a significant cause of concern for the purposes of this paper. 
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sets of provisions. More specifically, I have collected data regarding Court of Justice 
judgments mentioning each provision of the Charter through manual, term-specific 
searches on curia.europa.eu. For Articles 1-7 of the Charter, I searched for: “Article 
[number of the provision] of the Charter’”, excluding ‘of Fundamental Rights’ and 
including ‘Article’ to avoid results that refer to paragraphs 1-7 of other provisions. For 
Articles 8 and following, I searched for: “[number of the provision] of the Charter”, 
excluding ‘of Fundamental Rights’ and excluding ‘Article’ to ensure the possibility of a 
succession of provisions being mentioned, before the one in question. For provisions that 
have more than one paragraph, I searched for: “[number of the provision] of the Charter” 
comma “[number of the provision(number of paragraph)] of the Charter”.  
 
In terms of the number of cases, I have referred to distinct cases mentioning each provision 
rather than the overall number of mentions (i.e. cases which mention the provision in more 
than one document). The cases are, however, replicated when they refer to more than one 
provision of the Charter.16 
 
It must be acknowledged that this dataset carries the potential of error. First, it is likely that 
it is over-inclusive from a substantive perspective, as it contains mere mentions of Charter 
provisions, even where these do not play a significant role in the ruling. Secondly, there is 
a near-certainty of inadvertent under-inclusion, due to cases where ‘of the Charter’ is not 
mentioned immediately after the provision (e.g. where the provision is mentioned in the 
beginning or in the middle of a sequence of provisions of the Charter). Finally, I erred in 
favour of searching for references to the “Charter” rather than the “Charter of Fundamental 
Rights”, as this emerged as a formulation frequently used in the case law while trialling 
different terms, whereas the latter search would have excluded important rulings from the 
search results.17 However, this has made it impossible fully to exclude from this data 
possible overlaps with other Charters, namely:  
 Approximately 101 cases mentioning the Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of 
Workers after 2000, of which 45 are judgments.  
 Approximately 56 cases mentioning the European Social Charter after 2000, of 
which 16 are judgments and orders. 
 Approximately 33 cases mentioning the UN Charter after 2000, of which 23 are 
judgments. 
 
While I have sought manually to correct erroneous inclusion of references to these 
instruments in my results by browsing for content, it is possible that they have not been 
entirely rectified, particularly in respect of provisions with large numbers of mentions, such 
as Articles 47 and 21 of the Charter. As such, the data presented below should not be relied 
upon as confirming absolute numbers of references but, rather, as being only indicative of 
broad patterns in the Charter’s use by the Court of Justice.  
 
My data reflects the case law from 7 December 200018 to 30 November 2009 insofar as it 
concerns pre-Lisbon case law and from 1 December 2009 to 1 August 2019 insofar as it 
concerns post-Lisbon case law. 
 
                                                     
16 My understanding is that this is also the case for the official data of the European Commission and FRA, 
although this is not explicitly mentioned in their reports. 
17 E.g. Case C- 555/07, Kücükdeveci [2010] ECR I-365. 
18 The date of the Charter’s proclamation as a non-binding instrument.  
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Finally, I have relied upon the case law database of the FRA (‘Charterpedia’) to offer a 
cross-check on the numerical data highlighted above. The Charterpedia offers qualitatively 
accurate data per provision, in the sense that it lists under each provision of the Charter 
cases which have been analysed for content and directly relate to, rather than merely 
mentioning, the provision in question. However, as is clearly highlighted on the FRA’s 
website, the database is still a work in progress, which is neither complete nor up to date. 
More precisely, this database does not list all cases that deal with a particular provision, 
but only the ones deemed to be the most representative, especially for provisions that have 
been referred to extensively by the Court of Justice. Moreover, for most provisions, the 
latest cases mentioned date back to 2016, thus excluding important rulings in some fields, 
such as non-discrimination, working time, and the right to work, where substantive changes 
have taken place in the case law over the last two years.19 These issues restrict the potential 
of this database in showing broader trends and scale. However, the Charterpedia remains 
useful in highlighting provisions which have not been substantively used by the Court of 
Justice, as well as in checking for accuracy the findings stemming from the numerical data 
and, particularly, the originally collected right-by-right statistics.  
 
B. The Overall Impact of Formal Constitutionalisation on References to the 
Charter  
 
The principal finding that emerges from the data on the application of the Charter indicated 
above is the extent to which the Charter’s annexation to the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 has 
changed its use in EU fundamental rights discourse by the Court of Justice. As the 
Commission’s most recent report on the application of the Charter highlights, while there 
have been small drops in the number of overall mentions of the Charter for specific years 
(2015 and 2017), it is relatively clear that the attribution of binding effect to this instrument 
has made a discernible difference to its use in the case law within a short span of time.20 
The increase in overall references to the Charter is, indeed, very stark, with the Court of 
Justice having referred to the Charter in 356 cases in 2018, against only 27 in 2010. 
Preliminary ruling requests relating to the Charter rose from 19 in 2010 to 84 in 2018.21 
This is also highlighted by graphs 1.a and 1.b below, which represent the relationship 
between mentions of the Charter in Court of Justice judgments before and after the entry 
into force of the Lisbon Treaty, showing an increase in mentions of the Charter in final 
judgments for nearly all rights.  
 
Graph 1.a: Comparison of pre-Lisbon and Post-Lisbon Mentions of the Charter in 
Judgments of the Court of Justice (Data Source: search on curia.europa.eu) 
 
                                                     
19 It should also be noted that this database originally included Opinions and General Court and Civil 
Service Tribunal rulings which, as mentioned above, I have removed from the scope of my data collection. 
In turn, as the recalculation of the number of rulings mentioning each case without regard to Opinions and 
lower court rulings was carried out manually, there is a possibility of human error in this calculation. 
20 Commission Report 2018, available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/2018_annual_report_charter_en_0.pdf, accessed 15 August 2019, 
14. 




Graph 1.b: Comparison of pre-Lisbon and post-Lisbon Mentions of the Charter in 




It follows from this data that the clearest, albeit perhaps unsurprising, piece of statistical 
evidence that we have about the Lisbon Charter is that it has been numerically much more 
impactful on the case law than its earlier, non-binding counterpart. From only a handful of 
mentions of the non-binding Charter, and even fewer cases that actively grappled with its 
provisions, as suggested by the FRA data illustrated in graph 1.b., today all but two 
provisions of the Charter22 have been mentioned at the Court of Justice level altogether (in 
an Opinion, reference, judgment or order) and most have also been used in final judgments 
of the Union’s highest court.  
 
Still, while there is no denying that the binding Charter is displaying a much stronger 
presence in the case law when compared to the its pre-Lisbon iteration, it is worth looking 
more closely at the breakdown of judgments per provision and the average number of 
judgments per title, to understand both the extent to which the Court is likely to refer to 
different provisions of the Charter, as well as the extent to which its position vis-à-vis 
                                                     






















































































































































































































































































Graph 1.a.: Comparison of pre-Lisbon and Post-Lisbon Mentions of  the Charter in Judgments of the Court of Justice (search on curia.europa.eu)

























































































































































































































































































Graph 1.b: Comparison of pre-Lisbon and Post-Lisbon Mentions of the Charter in Judgements of the Court of Justice (FRA Charterpedia)
Judgments pre-Lisbon FRA Charterpedia Judgments post-Lisbon per provision
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particular types of rights (e.g. Citizens’ Rights, Solidarity etc.) has been equally 
encouraging. 
 
C. The data on specific provisions of the Charter 
 
Graphs 1.a and 1.b have already highlighted that there are significant discrepancies in the 
extent to which certain provisions of the Charter have been referred to in the case law. From 
these graphs, it appears rather striking that the Solidarity Title (Articles 27-38) has had the 
lowest concentration of judgments – immediately preceding the Dignity chapter before 
Lisbon but jumping behind it after Lisbon. The highest concentration of judgments falls in 
the Justice part of the Charter (Articles 46-50), followed by the Charter’s General 
provisions (Articles 51-54), Freedoms (Articles 6-19), Equality (Articles 20-26), and 
Citizen’s Rights (Articles 39-45).  This is confirmed by the year-by-year analysis of the 
distribution of judgments per Title of the Charter, available in the Commission’s 2018 
Report on its application.23  
 
Graph 2.a: Number of Charter Mentions in Judgments per Title (Data Source: 





What is especially interesting about this data is that it does not strictly correlate to the 
number of preliminary references per title, as presented in the same document and 
reproduced below: 
 
Graph 2.b: Number of Charter Mentions in Preliminary Reference Requests per Title 
(Data Source: European Commission Report 2018, p.15) 
                                                     
23 NB: it is unclear to the author why the General Provisions appear so underrepresented as a Title in the 
Commission’s graphs, when the numerical data per provision suggests that they are extensively relied upon. 
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As it is impossible to know when the cases referred to the Court, say, in 2016 or 2017 were 
decided, it is in turn difficult to make out a correlation between the preliminary ruling 
requests and the judgments, from this graph alone. What is evident from both of these 
European Commission graphs is that whilst some titles (such as Justice) feature in a stable 
manner in both preliminary ruling requests and judgments of the Court, other titles are over- 
or under- represented compared to the number of requests. For example, the Freedoms and 
Equality titles appear underrepresented in judgments compared to references, whereas 
Citizens’ Rights are overrepresented, especially after 2014. Nevertheless, the above graphs 
could be misleading proxies of how likely it is that the provisions of a particular title will 
be referred, as they do not work based on an average, despite the fact that some titles contain 
more provisions than others – Equality being, for example, the most compact one. As the 
aforementioned Report does not indicate the absolute numbers per Title, in graphs 3.a and 
3.b, I have sought to replicate such an assessment based on originally collected data, and 
subsequently computed the average mentions of the Charter per Title based on the number 
of provisions, with a view to approximating the likelihood of a mention in a judgment more 
effectively. These graphs confirm unequal mentions of different titles of the Charter in 
judgments of the Court of Justice, both in absolute terms and on average. 
 
Graph 3.a: Number of Charter Mentions per Title in Post-Lisbon Judgments (Data 




















I. Dignity II. Freedoms III. Equality IV. Solidarity V. Citizens' Rights VI. Justice VII. General Provisions




Graph 3.b: Average Number of Charter Mentions per Title in post-Lisbon judgments 




More specifically, both of the above graphs reveal that the Solidarity Chapter is the least 
frequently referred to in the Court’s judgments. That should not necessarily be taken to 
mean that the Court has not been eager to refer to this title at all or that this finding is not 
subject to year-by-year variations. Going back to graphs 2.a and 2.b, for instance, it may 
be observed that the mentions in rulings and preliminary reference requests concerning 
Solidarity were nearly equal in 2018, even though the Court had been more reluctant to 
refer to Solidarity in its rulings (compared to requests) in several previous years, in the 
same vein as with the Dignity Title.  
 
In other words, it must be acknowledged that changes may be taking place in respect of the 
frequency of references to these titles, which is something worth checking again a few years 
down the line. However, the exceptionalism of Article 47 and the general provisions 
remains evident over the last ten years, as does the relatively marginal treatment of the 
Solidarity, Dignity, and Citizen’s Rights Titles, across these different sets of data. Indeed, 
even more striking than the per-title apportionment of the Charter is the extent to which the 
case law has been dominated by certain provisions within the former two titles, as 





























I. Dignity II. Freedoms III. Equality IV. Solidarity V. Citizens' Rights VI. Justice VII. General Provisions
Graph 3.b: Average Number of Charter Mentions per Title in Post-Lisbon Judgments (search on curia.europa.eu)
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Graph 4.a: Mentions of the Charter per Provision in post-Lisbon Judgments (Data 




Interestingly, the FRA’s data through the Charterpedia (graph 4.b) generally confirm the 
major patterns of the distribution stemming from my research (graph 4.a), albeit with some 
discrepancies right-by-right, which are likely attributable to the non-exhaustive selection 
of cases presented in that database. This suggests that not only the number of judgments, 
but also the assessment of these rights by the Court, varies significantly.  
 
Graph 4.b: Mentions of the Charter per Provision in post-Lisbon Judgments (Data 




Both of these graphs show that a particular provision, Article 47, is towering over the 
adjudication of the Charter – a finding which is also cross-confirmed by nearly all 
Commission reports on the Charter since 2010.24 But the extent to which references to 
                                                     
24 Commission Report 2018 (n 20), p 16. Commission Report 2017, available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/2017_annual_charter_report_en.pdf, accessed 15 August 2019, 27; 
Commission Report 2016, available at https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/just/item-detail.cfm?item_id=125796  





























































































































































































































































































11 10 10 10
















































































































































































































































































Graph 4.b: Mentions of the Charter per Provision in post-Lisbon Judgments (FRA Charterpedia)
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Article 47 outweigh other references is staggering, as graph 4.a illustrates: Article 47 has 
been mentioned in more than double the number of judgments as the next most-often 
referred to provision (Article 52 – scope) and more than four times more often than the next 
most-often referred to substantive provision of the Charter (Article 21 on non-
discrimination). Particularly in light of the fact that, unlike the data for other provisions, 
the prominence of Article 47 is confirmed across all the datasets used, it is worth querying 
the reasons for its emergence as the protagonist of the Charter and, particularly, whether 
this right might be assuming an inflated role in EU fundamental rights discourse.25 
 
Secondly, the general provisions of the Charter and, more precisely, Articles 51 and 52 
thereof (concerning its field of application and scope of the protected rights and principles, 
respectively), are now assuming a central place in the adjudication of rights in the EU, 
together far outweighing all substantive provisions of the Charter (other than Article 47). 
On the one hand, this is of course a positive observation: references to the general 
provisions, as well as judgments grappling with them, consolidate the Charter’s role in the 
EU legal order and clarify its reach, so that national constitutional actors can play a more 
independent role in interpreting this instrument. These may also be the provisions where 
national constitutional courts might feel more inclined to make a reference, not only 
because the general provisions were the only ones which were changed between the pre- 
and post-Lisbon Charter, but also because the substantive provisions of the Charter (such 
as aspects of Equality) have had a much longer pedigree in EU fundamental rights law, 
with case law on these matters dating back to the early ’70s. On the other hand, the extent 
to which the spread of cases is occupied by Articles 51 and 52 could be read as suggesting 
a high degree of resistance to the Charter by national courts making the preliminary 
references in question and an arduous attempt on the part of the Court to define the contours 
of these provisions. This is largely to be expected in the first decade of the Charter’s binding 
existence. Yet, it would be worth revisiting these statistics on the Charter’s next decennial 
anniversary so as to understand whether and, if so, to what extent, the dust has settled or, 
indeed, to understand whether these provisions are simply consistently mentioned 
alongside other Charter rights as part of a developing jargon in the Charter’s adjudication 
(a possibility that I have not looked into in this analysis).  
 
Thirdly, some remarks can be made by looking at the broader distribution of rights. Based 
on the above data, the ten most frequently used provisions are the following. First, 
according to the FRA, the provisions in question are: Articles 47 (right to an effective 
                                                     
https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/just/item-detail.cfm?item_id=125806 accessed 15 August 2019, 28. 
Commission Report 2014, available at 
https://archiefotc01.archiefweb.eu/archives/archiefweb/20171122200726/http://ec.europa.eu/justice/fundam
ental-rights/files/2014_annual_charter_report_en.pdf accessed 15 August 2019, 27; Commission Report 
2013, available at 
https://archiefotc01.archiefweb.eu/archives/archiefweb/20171220210550/http:/ec.europa.eu/justice/fundam
ental-rights/charter/application/report/2013/index_en.htm accessed 15 August 2019, 25; Commission 
Report 2012, available at 
https://archiefotc01.archiefweb.eu/archives/archiefweb/20171122200739/http://ec.europa.eu/justice/fundam
ental-rights/files/charter_report_2012_en.pdf, accessed 15 August 2019, 14; Commission Report 2011, 
available at 
https://archiefotc01.archiefweb.eu/archives/archiefweb/20171122200744/http://ec.europa.eu/justice/fundam
ental-rights/files/charter_report_en.pdf accessed 15 August 2019, 16; Commission Report 2010, available 
at: 
https://archiefotc01.archiefweb.eu/archives/archiefweb/20171123021304/http://ec.europa.eu/justice/fundam
ental-rights/files/annual_report_2010_en.pdf  accessed 15 August 2019, 9.  
25 I go on to conduct this analysis in section III below. 
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remedy and to a fair trial), 52 (scope and interpretation of rights and principles), 7 (right to 
private and family life), 21 (non-discrimination), 51 (field of application), 17 (right to 
property), 20 (equality before the law), 16 (freedom to conduct a business), 8 (protection 
of personal data), and 41 (Right to good administration). Based on my numerical search on 
Curia, they emerge as: Articles 47, 52, 51, 21, 7, 41, 17, 48 (Presumption of innocence and 
right of defence), 16, 49 (Principles of legality and proportionality of criminal offences and 
penalties). It follows that there are some discrepancies between the two datasets, such that 
it is difficult to present a verified account of the Court’s preponderance to mention specific 
rights. Some of these discrepancies could, however, be explained by the fact that the FRA 
data is based on sampling according to significance. Articles 48 and 49, which do not 
feature quite as prominently in the graph based on FRA data are, indeed, provisions that 
tend to be raised in conjunction with Article 47 in claims concerning due process. 
Furthermore, aside from these discrepancies, both datasets clearly show a prevalence of 
specific freedoms and types of rights in three main areas – a finding also supported by the 
Commission reports.26 Alongside the scope and contours of the guaranteed rights, these 
areas are: judicial protection/effective remedy, non-discrimination, and private life/data 
protection. 
 
Of course, it is essential to bear in mind that these themes are also, as the Commission has 
observed, reflected in references to the Charter by national courts.27 Thus, a parallelism 
between the type of cases that national courts are interested in and the references to the 
Charter in judgments of the Court of Justice is to be expected. However, even if it concerns 
national courts as much as the Court of Justice, and even if only patterns, rather than 
conclusions, can be drawn from this analysis, identifying those overall patterns in respect 
of the case law on the Charter remains valuable. It cannot be overlooked, for example, that 
the ten most referred to provisions of the Charter, with the exception perhaps of process-
based rights, are all provisions that could – in rather unfashionable terminology –  be 
considered negative freedoms (such as non-discrimination, undue incursions on the private 
sphere, on the enjoyment of property, and on business activity). This is important insofar 
as the Charter remains one of the few binding and, as I have sought to highlight earlier, 
extensively applied, fundamental rights instruments that include rights thought to have 
more positive dimensions28 and, especially, social rights. 
 
D. Interim Conclusion Drawn from the Above Data  
 
The statistical information allows for some – if limited – insights into the Charter’s first 
decade as a binding instrument. First, the Charter has, overall, been overwhelmingly more 
present in EU law since its entry into binding force than it had been pre-Lisbon. Secondly, 
there appears to be a marked focus on the right to an effective remedy and associated rights, 
as well as potential contestation over the Charter’s field of application and the scope of the 
rights and principles protected therein. Finally, it is also clear that the Charter has had less 
of a focus on positive action and collective rights than it has had on certain personal 
liberties, such as privacy, the freedom to conduct a business, and the freedom from arbitrary 
interference with property. In the remainder of this paper, these findings will be used as 
cues for raising broader, conceptual challenges to the Charter’s application. Section III 
follows the patterns that this numerical analysis has thrown up and attempts to explain them 
                                                     
26 Commission Report 2018 (n 20) 16. 
27 Ibid, 31. 
28 As I go on to argue below, the negative/positive distinction rests on assumptions that have been 
disproved over time and should, therefore, be resisted. 
 13 
through a deeper review of aspects of the Court’s case law and an engagement with their 
merits, against the broader context of fundamental rights protection that led to the creation 
of the Charter. Ultimately, it develops a critique of a focus on the general provisions, 
procedural rights, and negative freedoms, as indicative of judicial resistance to the 
Charter’s embracement of a more tenacious conception of rights than that developed in the 
case law that predates it. 
III. Continuity and Category Errors in the Application of the Charter Post-
Lisbon  
If reliance on mere numbers is not enough to assess the effectiveness of the Charter in its 
ten years as a binding instrument, against what benchmark should the above data be 
interpreted? What would be a better standard to determine the effectiveness of the Charter, 
both in respect of its overall impact on fundamental rights and in respect of the impact of 
its specific provisions?  
 
The Charter’s drafting context can be helpful in this regard. The proclamation of the non-
binding Charter in 2000 had sought to further develop the EU’s own understanding of 
rights, by designating as ‘fundamental’ a group of provisions that reflected the ‘Union 
experience’.29 It thus purposefully included both fundamental rights protected in national 
constitutions and the ECHR and rights more specific to the operation of the Union, such as 
non-discrimination and the protection of EU citizenship, through political rights and free 
movement. Indeed, the drafting of the Charter was largely indistinguishable from the 
Union’s broader constitutional project as it prepared for a Constitutional Treaty,30  thus 
acquiring an important symbolic value even as a non-binding instrument: it raised a debate 
about the direction of the EU beyond its economic roots and towards an expanded identity 
as a ‘human rights organisation’31 or, even, as a federal polity.32 In turn, the binding Charter 
– albeit only as an Annex to the Treaties, rather than as an integral part thereof, as the 
Constitution would have had it – continues overtly to support a project of 
constitutionalisation qua democratic self-government. Crucially, it speaks on behalf of ‘the 
peoples of Europe’, whom it imagines as ‘bound together by a common heritage’ and by 
‘shared values.’  
 
For these reasons, the Charter could be thought to address well-known critiques of EU 
fundamental rights law, such as that the Court was not advancing a serious or cogent vision 
of rights protection and that it was using fundamental rights as means to its own ends, i.e. 
                                                     
29 European Commission Directorate-General for Employment, Industrial Relations, and Social Affairs, 
‘Affirming Fundamental Rights in the European Union: Time to Act’ (1999) Report of the Expert Group on 





99-181-EN-C> accessed 15 May 2016, 10. 
30 See further G De Burca and B Aschenbrenner, ‘The Development Of European Constitutionalism And 
The Role Of The EU Charter Of Fundamental Rights’ (2003) 9 Columbia Journal of European Law 355.  
31 A Von Bogdandy, ‘The European Union as a Human Rights Organisation? Human Rights 
and the Core of the European Union’ (2000) 37:6 Common Market Law Review 1307. 
32 P Eeckhout, ‘The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Federal Question’ (2002) 39 Common 
Market Law Review 945, 990. 
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in order to strengthen the autonomy, primacy, and effectiveness of EU law.33 After all, it 
cannot be forgotten that, whilst the creation of what Mancini called an ‘unwritten bill of 
rights’ through the general principles jurisprudence was the Court’s most significant 
contribution to the EU constitutional project, the commitment to rights ‘was forced on the 
Court by the outside’– initially by the German and, later, by other constitutional courts.34 
While the extension of the general principles jurisprudence had already started to soften 
such criticisms before the entry into force of the Charter, especially through an emphasis 
on equality,35 the Charter concretised this shift away from a conception of rights as 
externally imposed standards. Deriving its legitimacy from a political consultation process 
and appeals to shared values, it represented a potential for EU fundamental rights to acquire 
a meaning distinguishable from the ‘fear of consequence’36 that had driven the Court’s 
early case law.37 Equally, it could be seen as a prompt for redefining EU fundamental rights 
as goals in their own right, in contrast to the basic structure of judgments such as 
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, Nold, and Hauer, in which fundamental rights were 
conceptualised as in principle limitable by the Union’s goal of establishing an internal 
market, provided that their essence was not compromised.38  
 
Looking at the ways in which the post-Lisbon case law has responded to the main criticisms 
of the Union’s system of fundamental rights protection before the Charter’s entry into force 
– namely, as Douglas-Scott reconstructs them, those of ‘incoherence, and of manipulation 
of rights for other purposes’39 – is, therefore, key to assessing how much its codification 
changed the application of fundamental rights in practice. For instance, could such critiques 
explain the statistical information presented earlier, such as the prevalence of Article 47 
and the general provisions in mentions of the Charter by the Court of Justice, or the 
comparative silence on positive rights and the Solidarity Title? As the following 
subsections highlight, it is arguable that the uneasy development of fundamental rights in 
EU law can be traced across these patterns, thus indicating a mismatch between the case 
law on the Charter, on the one hand, and the ennobling words of the Charter’s Preamble, 
on the other. 
 
A. Articles 51 and 52(3) CFR: Affirming the Charter’s Constitutional Status  
 
On a superficial level, the changes effectuated by the Charter upon the Court’s discourse 
are certainly remarkable: based on the statistics presented earlier, there are more than two 
thousand references to provisions of the Charter in final judgments of the Court of Justice 
in only ten years of binding application. The Charter has thus steadily (and not that slowly) 
                                                     
33 See J Coppell and A O’Neill,‘The European Court of Justice: Taking Rights Seriously?’ (1992) 29 
Common Market Law Review 669. 
34 GF Mancini, ‘The Making of a Constitution for Europe’ (1989) 26 Common Market Law Review 595, 
596.  
35 Joined Cases 117/ 76 and 16/ 77, Ruckdeschel [1977] ECR 
1753, para 7. 
36 A Williams, ‘Taking Values Seriously: Towards a Philosophy of EU Law’ (2009) 23:1 OJLS 549, 565. 
37 See, most notably, Case C-144/04, Mangold [2005] ECR I-9981. On why equality, as a relational value, 
nevertheless does not amount to a positive vision of rights in the Union, see further R Xenidis, 
‘Transforming EU Equality Law? On Disruptive Narratives and False Dichotomies’ (2019) YEL 1. 
38 Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft [1970] ECR I- 1125; Case 4/ 73, Nold [1974] ECR 491; 
Case 44/ 79, Hauer [1979] ECR 3727 
39 S Douglas-Scott, ‘The European Union and Human Rights after the Treaty of Lisbon’ (2011) 11:4 
Human Rights Law Review 645, 650. 
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assumed a constitutional place at the apex of the EU hierarchy of norms.40 But the terse 
history of fundamental rights in Union law can also be considered a reason for the many 
references to the scope and field of application of the Charter in the Court’s case law. The 
general provisions are the main vehicles of primacy within the Charter’s text and, hence, 
an important point of contestation between national courts and the Court of Justice.  
 
Aspects of the case law on the general provisions have already become a well-developed 
area of post-Lisbon jurisprudence. Indeed, while the desirability or activism of its findings 
in this regard may have been strongly debated internally41, it is noteworthy that the case 
law on the Charter’s constitutional status, especially as it emerges from the Charter’s 
overall field of application under Article 51 thereof, has acquired a nearly unambiguous 
meaning. The Court’s finding in Fransson42 that, in being addressed to Member States 
‘when implementing EU law’, the Charter is applicable whenever the scope of application 
of EU law is engaged, has remained valid and has been firmly reiterated by the Court in 
subsequent case law.43 The Court has also affirmed the Charter’s prominence as the 
primary source of fundamental rights protection in the Union based on Article 52(3)44 and 
has, albeit in my view regrettably, consistently replaced the Convention with the Charter 
(not by dropping standards below the requisite level, but by objecting to accession and not 
engaging with the Strasbourg Court’s case law in its rulings)45 as well as by emphasising 
uniformity, rather than best practices in the substantive protection of human rights.46  
 
Judged against the critique of incoherence, then, the Court’s increasingly unitary treatment 
of the Charter’s overall status as the constitutional source par excellence of fundamental 
rights within the scope of EU law must be noted. Judged against the critique of 
instrumentalization or manipulation of rights for other purposes, the picture is more mixed: 
while it is not suggested that the Charter has harmed the protection of fundamental rights 
in the EU compared to the Convention standard, the resistance to accession and to the use 
of Strasbourg case law, as well as to UN standards, as highlighted by the Kadi litigation,47 
has many lamentable features. Referring to other human rights norms is not just useful for 
the purpose of making sure that the presumption of compatibility48 is met.  Particularly in 
the absence of a formal possibility of appeal to the Convention, which prevents effective 
judicial supervision of human rights issues by a specialised external body,49 using the 
Strasbourg Court’s interpretative principles on structural/conceptual questions concerning 
                                                     
40 Of course, it could be questioned whether, rather than having the ‘same legal status as the Treaties’ the 
Charter should, alongside perhaps aspects of the TEU, attain a superior constitutional place. See further on 
this: D Grimm, ‘The Democratic Costs of Constitutionalisation: The European Case’ (2015) 21:4 European 
Law Journal 460. 
41 D Sarmiento, ‘Who’s Afraid of the Charter? The Court of Justice, National Courts and the New 
Framework of Fundamental Rights Protection in Europe’ (2013) 50:5 Common Market Law Review 1267, 
1275– 6.  
42 Case C‑617/10 Åkerberg Fransson, EU:C:2013:105, para 19. 
43 See, e.g., Case C‑198/13 Hernández EU:C:2014:2055, para 33 and Case C‑206/13 Siragusa, 
EU:C:2014:126, para 35 (which clarifies that the scope of the Charter and the scope of general principles is 
the same). 
44 See, e.g. Case C- 501/ 10, Kamberaj, EU:C:2012:233, paras 62- 63 and 80. 
45 Opinion 2/13 re ECHR Accession EU:C:2014:2454. For a thoughtful critique, see P Eeckhout, ‘Opinion 
2/13 on EU Accession to the ECHR and Judicial Dialogue: Autonomy or Autarky?’ 2015 (38:4) Fordham 
Intl L J 955. 
46 See, e.g. Case C-399/11, Melloni, EU:C:2013:107. 
47 Joined Cases C-402/05P and C-415/05P, Kadi v Council and Commission [2008] ECRI-6351. 
48 ECtHR, Bosphorus v Ireland, App. No. 45036/98, judgment of 30 June 2005. 
49 Douglas-Scott (n 39) 658-9. 
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the protection of fundamental rights would have been an important indicator of their 
accuracy and legitimacy on the merits.  
 
It follows that a strong sense of ownership of fundamental rights can have a darker side: 
while there is no doubt more fundamental rights based reasoning in the Union, even on 
issues that engender important disagreements amongst the Member States such as gay 
marriage50, and thus a greater degree of confidence with affirming human rights,51 that 
confidence can at times be read as excessive isolationism from external checks on the 
correctness of the Court’s interpretation of fundamental rights. It can also be seen as 
highlighting a continuing, excessive reliance on primacy as the key internal justificatory 
mechanism in matters of rights protection.52 This is, in turn, manifested in significant 
hesitation with re-adjusting constitutional priorities because of the Charter, which can be 
seen in the limited impact of Article 52 CFR upon the Court’s reasoning in respect of 
legitimate limitations of rights and the nature of a distinction between rights and principles.  
B. Article 52(1) CFR and the Quest for a ‘Fair Balance’  
As Prechal notes, ‘when compared to the pre-Charter era, Article 52(1) CFR structures in 
a more compelling fashion the review of limitations of fundamental rights’53 by asking that 
such review be conducted on the basis of a Convention-inspired test. In line with this 
provision, limitations to the Charter must be prescribed by law in pursuance of a legitimate 
aim and subject to the principle of proportionality. This could have been a significant 
change to the status quo, which had manifested a much more flexible, variable notion of 
proportionality, allowing a variety of interests to be taken into account in analysing the 
legality of restrictions upon rights and, most notably, the Union’s goals in advancing 
policies relating to the internal market.54  
 
Nevertheless, while such a change is obvious in the Charter’s text, it is not clearly reflected 
in the Court’s post-Lisbon case law. Whereas the terminology of Article 52(1) is at times 
used by Advocates General,55 the analysis of the relationship between fundamental rights 
and market freedoms, as well as between different types of rights, has not always followed 
the structure suggested by this provision. Rather, cases that involved multiple right-holders, 
such as Alemo-Herron and Achbita, have highlighted the continued relevance of an old 
formula: that, rather than interpreting the scope of the protected rights, the Court strives to 
reach a ‘fair balance’56 between them, in order to give effect to a ‘double aim, at once 
                                                     
50 See, e.g. Case C-267/06, Maruko [2008] I-01757; LS Rossi, ‘How Fundamental are Fundamental 
Principles? Primacy and Fundamental Rights after Lisbon’ (2008) 27:1 YEL 65, 83. 
51 Rossi, ibid, 83-87. 
52 Douglas-Scott (n 39) 675-6; R Ziegler, ‘Strengthening the Rule of Law, but Fragmenting International 
Law: The Kadi Decision of the ECJ from the Perspective of Human Rights’ (2009) 9 Human Rights Law 
Review 288; G De Búrca,‘The ECJ and the International Legal Order after Kadi’(2009) 51 Harvard Journal 
of International Law 1. 
53 S Prechal, ‘The Court of Justice and Effective Judicial Protection: What Has the Charter Changed?’ in C 
Paulussen, T Takacs, V Lazic, and B van Rompuy (eds), Fundamental Rights in International and 
European Law (Springer 2015) 143, 154. 
54 As suggested in cases such as Nold (n 38). 
55 See Opinion of AG Bobek in Case C-190/16, Fries [2017] EU:C:2017:225, paras 65-78. 
56 Case C-426/11, Alemo-Herron, ECLI:EU:C:2013:521, para 25. See also Case C-157/15, Achbita, 
ECLI:EU:C:2017:203; S Jolly, ‘Achbita & Bougnaoui: A strange kind of equality’, Cloisters 15 March 
2017,  <http://www.cloisters.com/blogs/achbita-bougnaoui-a-strange-kind-of-equality>, accessed 
8/01/2018; L Vickers, One Step Forward and Two Steps Back for Religious Diversity in the Workplace’ 
(2017) 8:3 European Labour Law Journal 232, 253-255. 
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economic and social’, in line with its settled case law and, particularly, its ruling in 
Defrenne II.57 Taken out of its initial context, though, this approach skews interpretations 
of fundamental rights that lean more strongly towards one or the other realm.  
 
Balancing has been deeply criticised in the fundamental rights context as an inadequate 
response to the increasing complexity of the values that underpin rights.58 It is particularly 
problematic, as Ladeur has pointed out, because in extending the adjudication of rights to 
include all relevant interests, it corrodes the ‘definitional contours’59 of the rights 
themselves. Under the Charter, this can be seen most sharply in an especially broad 
construction of contractual freedom (enshrined in the freedom to conduct a business 
protected in Article 16 CFR) that has moved away from the normative roots of this freedom 
as non-interference towards a vision of it as the absence of regulatory restraint.60  
 
More generally, the idea of a ‘fair balance’ is an appealing avenue for courts, especially at 
the supranational level, because it removes the need for a difficult analysis of what amounts 
to a widely recognised legitimate aim or sufficient incursion on the rights of others, while 
maintaining the illusion of objectivity associated with the imagery of a balancing scale.61 
As Ladeur points out, that scale is often not a common one. In theory, ‘[t]here are obviously 
easy cases in which such a common “scale” exists: e.g. in cases of conflicts of a public and 
a private financial interest (the common denominator is money) or the comparison between 
the importance of a personal injury – this is the realm of proportionality in a traditional 
sense […]’. 62 In respect of fundamental rights, however, how could there be a balance, say, 
between ‘the freedom of the press and the right to privacy, without a reconstruction of the 
evolution of the social role of the press, its professional rules and the present function of 
the rules about protection of privacy?’63 The ‘quasi-rational operation of balancing, 
understood as the “optimisation” of conflicting civil rights based on the proportionality 
principle’ fails to take into account the situatedness of rights within the specific parameters 
of a democratic society, thus reduces the normative force that they maintain as its 
foundations.64  
 
It follows that, both due to its questionable conceptual applicability to human rights and 
the fact that, in contrast to the Convention, Article 52(1) employs limitations in respect of 
all Charter provisions,65 the idea of a fair balance could become problematic for the 
application of the Charter as a whole. But it is worth highlighting that, in the EU context in 
particular, the idea of balancing that emerges from the case law, rather than a clearer use 
of the terminology of Article 52(1), is likely to have a more significant impact on the 
                                                     
57 Defrenne (n 8), para 12. 
58 K Ladeur, ‘A critique of balancing and the principle of proportionality in constitutional law – a case for 
‘impersonal rights’?’ (2016) 7:2 Transnational Legal Theory 228, 244. See also S Tsakyrakis, 
‘Proportionality: An assault on human rights?’ (2003) 7:3 ICON 468. 
59 Ladeur, ibid, 232; see further Tsakyrakis, ibid, 479-480. 
60 See further on this: J Prassl, ‘Freedom of Contract as a General Principle of EU Law? Transfers of 
Undertakings and the Protection of Employer Rights in EU Labour Law (Case C-426/11 Alemo-Herron v 
Parkwood Leisure)’ (2013) 42 Industrial Law Journal 434; J Prassl, ‘Business Freedoms and Employment 
Rights in the European Union’ (2015) 17 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 189; S 
Weatherill, ‘Use and Abuse of the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights: On the Improper Veneration of 
‘Freedom of Contract’’ (2014) 10 European Review of Contract Law 157.  
61 Tsakyrakis (n 58) 475. 
62 Ladeur (n 58), 249. 
63 Ibid.  
64 Ibid.  
65 Prechal (n 53) 156; Douglas-Scott (n 39) 652. 
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Charter’s protections going beyond the ECHR (predominantly, more extensive economic 
freedoms on enterprise and cross-border movement, as well as social rights). Not only are 
these rights not subject to a requirement of observance of the ECHR as a minimum 
requirement. At the same time, the transplantation of the idea of a ‘fair balance’ to these 
provisions is especially problematic because it stems from – and entrenches – a different, 
hybrid constitutional context:66 one in which market freedoms enjoyed explicit protection 
in the Union, as against an underdeveloped social dimension.  
 
For this reason, whereas the idea of a fair balance in Defrenne – however conceptually 
problematic – might have had an inclusionary impact on EU law by improving the 
substantive protection of a fundamental right (equal pay), today it has the opposite effect. 
It inadvertently works as a stalling mechanism for fundamental rights expressing a range 
of values beyond economic freedom, as it jumps the step of positively demonstrating that 
economic freedom is a legitimate limitation on the exercise of these rights. Most notably 
perhaps, an unquestioned balancing act between the economic and the social goals of the 
Union creates a significant hurdle for certain Charter provisions. As I have argued in more 
detail elsewhere, some of these rights, such as collective labour rights, necessarily lose out 
when subjected to the terminology of balancing, because their effectiveness depends 
precisely on being able to suspend an employer’s pursuit of economic activities, rather than 
being balanced with it.67 For this reason, foregoing reasoned and detailed analysis of 
limitations of these rights under the ‘prescribed by law’ and ‘pursuance of a legitimate aim’ 
elements of the Article 52(1) formula can create a structural preference for market-friendly 
elements of rights protection, without working just as well for others.68  
 
This may explain, in part, both the contestability of Article 52 as well as the overall 
distribution in references to the Charter in the above statistics, which showed a greater 
emphasis on economic rights, such as the enjoyment of property, the freedom to conduct a 
business, and the right to work (construed by the Court as a right to engage in economic 
activity)69 than mentions of provisions pertaining to Solidarity as well as, albeit perhaps 
less evidently, civil liberties and the provisions of the Dignity Title. Such a dichotomous 
view of rights can more broadly be attributed, as this paper goes on to argue, to a failure to 
understand fundamental rights as interrelated, interdependent, and indivisible, which has 
both material and structural implications for the role of fundamental rights in the Union. 
The understanding of labour rights as part of the ‘social’ and distinct from the ‘market’, for 
instance, fails to represent the significant benefits that the enjoyment of labour rights 
provides to the market, not only in respect of fairness, but also of efficiency70  and, in turn, 
the value of personal freedoms, including economic freedom, entail for self-realisation and 
substantive equality. Finally, this view of rights exacerbates another important drawback 
                                                     
66 C Joerges, ‘The Impact of European Integration on Private Law: Reductionist Perceptions, True Conflicts 
and a New Constitutional Perspective’ (1997) 3:4 European Law Journal 378, 383. 
67 E Frantziou, ‘Constitutional Reasoning in the European Union and the Charter of Fundamental Rights: In 
Search of Public Justification’ (2019) 25:2 EPL; see also E Frantziou, ‘Case C-176/12 Association de 
Médiation Sociale: Some Reflections on the Horizontal Effect of the Charter and the Reach of Fundamental 
Employment Rights in the European Union’ (2014) 10 EuConst 332. 
68 E Frantziou, The Horizontal Effect of Fundamental Rights in the European Union: A Constitutional 
Analysis (OUP 2019) 124; F De Witte, ‘The Architecture of a Social Market Economy’ (2015) LSE Law, 
Society and Economy Working Paper 13/2015, 19. 
69 See further V Mantouvalou and E Frantziou, ‘Article 15’, forthcoming in S Peers, T Hervey, J Kenner, 
and A Ward (eds) The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Commentary (2nd edn, Hart 2020). 
70 I Lianos, N Countouris, and V De Stefano, ‘Re-thinking the competition law/labour law interaction: 
Promoting a fairer labour market’ (2019) 10:3 ELLJ 291. 
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in the Court’s treatment of Article 52: an often unclear analysis of the distinction between 
rights and principles made in Article 52(5) CFR.  
C. Solidarity Provisions and the Quest for Indivisibility 
The idea that, rather than being in a relationship of subordination to civil and political 
rights, all rights are interdependent, interrelated, and indivisible,71 was acknowledged early 
on in the UN system. For example, the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1965, included 
a prohibition of discrimination in the enjoyment of a range of economic, social and cultural 
rights.72 The Universal Declaration itself had included social rights, such as the right to 
housing and the right to work.73 Despite this recognition of the status of social rights, 
however, the idea that such rights required a different form of implementation (through the 
progressive deployment of appropriate State policies)74 also settled into international 
human rights law relatively early, splitting it between the ICCPR and ICESCR and, in the 
European context, between the Convention and European Social Charter. In turn, since at 
least the 1980s, the differentiated understanding in the implementation of types or 
‘generations’ of rights has been criticised as overly hierarchising and stalling of the 
development of social and economic rights, rather than contributing to their advancement.75  
The Charter had promised to change this state of affairs for the better, by moving beyond 
the entrenchment of social rights in mostly non-justiciable human rights treaties. Its 
Preamble states: ‘Conscious of its spiritual and moral heritage, the Union is founded on the 
indivisible, universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity; it is based 
on the principles of democracy and the rule of law.’ Of course, it cannot be ignored that the 
Charter’s appeal to indivisibility relates to the values underpinning its different titles and 
not to the rights contained in those titles themselves. But, even so, the link is not difficult 
to forge: how can there be dignity in destitution or persistent unemployment? Justice in 
discrimination? Freedom without democratic processes of participation and non-
interference with personal integrity? As Nickel puts it, ‘within a system of successfully 
implemented human rights, many rights support and reinforce other rights. For example, 
due process rights support […] freedoms by constraining abuses of the criminal law that 
undermine those freedoms. Due process rights also support equality rights by blocking 
some manifestations of racism in criminal trials.’76 
And yet, as Douglas-Scott has noted, while ‘the Charter presents human rights as 
indivisible, several of its provisions limit them in other ways’ – most notably, through an 
‘unfortunate’ distinction between rights and principles, provided for in Article 52(5) 
thereof.77 As the Explanations to the Charter do not make clear which provisions are 
‘rights’ and which are ‘principles’, the distinction is unhelpful, particularly because 
                                                     
71 ‘Indivisibility is a very strong form of interdependence’: JW Nickel, ‘Rethinking Indivisibility: Towards 
A Theory of Supporting Relations between Human Rights’ (2008) 30 Human Rights Quarterly 984, 987. 
72 O De Schutter, ‘Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as Human Rights: An Introduction’ (2003) 
CRIDHO‐WP‐2013/2, 3-4. 
73 Articles 25 and 23 UDHR, respectively. 
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provisions which have a long-standing history as enforceable rights in EU law, such as 
gender equality, are labelled as ‘principles’ within the Charter.78 An understanding of social 
rights as programmatic or ‘aspirational’, rather than as creating the same obligations as 
other rights, thus risked becoming a reality predominantly for the Charter’s Solidarity 
provisions – something that the distinction between rights and principles indeed sought to 
preserve, according to the UK’s representative in the Charter’s drafting process.79 All of 
this suggests that, already at the time of the Charter’s creation, its proclaimed indivisibility 
was but a ‘mirage.’80  
Ten years after the entry into force of the binding Charter, the question of whether the 
Charter’s provisions have the same legal status remains strikingly pertinent and 
substantively unanswered. Not only is Article 52 of the Charter the second most referred 
to provision after Article 47, suggesting a continuing and substantial lack of clarity 
regarding the scope of the protected rights, insofar as it concerns the Charter’s ‘principles’. 
At the same time, both the data drawn from curia.europa.eu and the FRA data per provision 
have highlighted that the designation of the Charter’s provisions as ‘principles’ has hardly 
any bearing on the extent to which the Court is prepared to associate them with enforceable 
rights. For example, aside from Article 23 (the principle of equality between men and 
women), Article 49 (enshrining the principles of legality and proportionality in criminal 
sanctions) is one of the most litigated provisions of the Charter, thus resulting – despite the 
terminology of principles – in justiciable rights. It might then be thought that this is not bad 
news for the Solidarity Title after all, where most of the Charter’s mere ‘aspirations’81 are 
found. Indeed, perhaps the most positive development that the interpretation of the binding 
Charter has brought about, from the lens of human rights theory, is that the Court has not 
read a formal distinction into the legal status of any thematic set of provisions.82 Rather, 
the Court has, albeit only recently, in Bauer, emphatically affirmed the enforceability of 
some of the social rights protected in the Solidarity Title.83 It has thus succeeded in 
retaining the Charter’s quality as a binding instrument across its different titles.  
Nevertheless, the case law has not been similarly successful in showing a coherent 
commitment to all of the fundamental social rights protected in the Charter as equal subsets 
of an indivisible and interconnected set of values. On the one hand, that is due to the Court’s 
use of balancing discourse, the problems of which were discussed earlier. On the other, it 
is attributable to an insufficient explanation of what is meant by the distinction between 
rights and principles, through the Court’s resort to another well-known aspect of early case 
law: the development of a hierarchy of rights based on their enforceability under the direct 
effect formula. Whereas the Court has not applied the rights/principles distinction strictly, 
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it has qualified the status of some provisions primarily within the Solidarity Title, such as 
Article 27, by referring to a test of invocability. This was the bearing of the much-criticised 
Association de Médiation Sociale ruling, where the Court found that the right to 
information and consultation within the undertaking enshrined in Article 27 of the Charter 
did not result in a right that could be invoked ‘as such’ against Member States or other 
private actors, unlike, e.g., Article 21 on non-discrimination (and, eventually, Articles 47 
on effective judicial protection and Article 31 on fair working conditions).84  
How can such a re-drawing of the Charter’s provisions through rights invocable ‘as such’ 
and rights that cannot be so invoked be rationalised? While it is impossible to ignore that 
the statistics offered in Section II above highlight an overall less prominent role for 
provisions of the Charter that fall within the Solidarity title, to draw the conclusion that the 
Court has actively or consciously undermined Solidarity provisions would be inaccurate. 
Not only are references to the Solidarity Title increasing, but it is also becoming clearer 
that aspects of that Title create justiciable rights in the same way as non-discrimination, 
privacy or effective remedies.85 A more convincing argument might be that it is generally 
rights with more positive dimensions that run up against the problem of non-justiciability. 
Indeed, a key reason for differentiating between the implementation of social rights and 
civil and political rights in other human rights instruments has traditionally been a 
positive/negative understanding of rights, whereby social rights were predominantly 
conceived as positive rights, in the sense that they have resource implications.86 In turn, 
courts often shy away from expenditure decisions, both due to lack of expertise and, more 
importantly, because of a broader institutional objection that they are not the right forum 
to be taking decisions with important policy repercussions, such as the attribution of funds 
to particular purposes.87 It may not come as a surprise, therefore, that rights that clearly 
bear on resources, such as social security and the right to access a free placement service, 
have never given rise to a ruling at the Court of Justice level. Furthermore, as the AMS 
ruling highlights,88 the Charter’s text itself embraces conditionality of most social rights on 
national laws and practices, thereby suggesting that interpretations of these rights should 
be conducted in a spirit of deference to the requirements of national law, which may reflect 
the varied availability of resources and different levels of welfare protection in the Member 
States.  
The above reasons do not, however, offer an easy or complete fit with the distinction drawn 
in AMS, when it is looked at within the broader case law on the Charter and, particularly, 
decisions such as Bauer and CCOO.89 Amongst the Charter’s social rights, the right to 
information and consultation is a protection that does not require substantial state 
expenditure, rather than appropriate protective legislative action (in addition to that 
envisaged by EU law in Directive 2002/14/EC). By the same token, rights such as Article 
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31 and, even, Articles 23 on equal pay and Article 47 on effective judicial protection, which 
are subject to intense scrutiny and enjoy direct effect in EU law even against private actors, 
do have immediate resource implications, despite the fact that they do not depend on 
national laws and practices. Thus, what appears rather more neatly tied to the invocability 
of Charter provisions ‘as such’ is not negative status altogether in the sense of rights that 
are non-resource-intensive or independent of national laws and practices,90 but a particular 
kind of negative status, associated the well-known direct effect formula: that rights should 
give rise to clearly ascertainable obligations and that they should not be subject to the need 
for further implementation beyond any applicable Union law.  
Such an EU-specific understanding of the meaningfulness of fundamental rights is 
supported not only by the case law on the Solidarity chapter, but also by looking at other 
oft-referred to provisions, which share important elements. Privacy, non-discrimination, 
and the protection of property and entrepreneurial activity, alongside (perhaps most clearly 
of all) the right to effective judicial protection, can all be construed as predominantly 
individualizable protections strongly associated with private enforcement by ‘vigilant’ 
right-holders.91  It is, in turn, unsurprising that these provisions have a relatively easy 
transposition to the Charter era, insofar as the notion of rights that emerges from the case 
law remains one of sufficiently clear, precise, and unconditional interests in the 
enforcement of the Charter.  
Thus, albeit not expressing a two-speed theory of progressive realisation for entire titles of 
the Charter, a linkage of the concept of rights within the Charter with direct effect appears 
only to maintain a divisible and differentiated understanding of fundamental rights, under 
another label. This creates three significant problems for the adjudication of fundamental 
rights: first, insofar as it conceptualises rights as interests to be privately enforced, the Court 
appears almost entirely to exclude rights which are not invocable as such from meaningful 
constitutional review, as highlighted by the AMS ruling.92 That is the case despite the fact 
that the division of the Charter into rights and principles could nevertheless have provided 
for the protection of principles in certain circumstances. Indeed, it cannot be overlooked 
that Article 52(5) of the Charter envisages that provisions which express principles ‘may 
be implemented by legislative and executive acts taken by institutions, bodies, offices and 
agencies of the Union, and by acts of Member States when they are implementing Union 
law, in the exercise of their respective powers.’93 Rather than resulting in a lack of 
justiciability altogether, therefore, these provisions remain ‘judicially cognisable in the 
interpretation of [EU legislative and executive] acts [and of implementing acts of the 
Member States] and in the ruling on their legality.’  
 
Secondly, the direct effect conditions present an unlikely – if not artificial – standard for 
many fundamental rights. Rather than being clear, precise, and unconditional, many 
fundamental rights, just like general principles before them, operate on a level of 
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abstraction and generality uncharacteristic of other legal norms.94 Indeed, referring to pre-
existing case law for support of findings of justiciability fails particularly where the Charter 
breaks new ground, by transposing to the supranational level common constitutional 
traditions not previously envisaged in the case law and, most clearly, rights that do not offer 
a precise interest in a tangible or intangible thing, such as arrangements for the 
improvement of working conditions through collective bargaining or rights to a future 
benefit (e.g. a healthy environment). In this sense, the ‘double asymmetry’ identified by 
Scharpf is clearly manifested in the interpretation of the Charter:95 on the one hand, EU law 
now recognises the need for fundamental rights, yet seeks to reconcile them with a partly 
economic discourse that does not always accord them primacy. On the other hand, it errs 
in favour of a self-preserving circularity through appeals to its own earlier iterations, rather 
than acknowledging other sources of legitimacy. 
 
Last but not least, the appeal to direct effect in the assessment of justiciability is problematic 
insofar as it embeds protective functions not into the substantive provisions of the Charter 
but into a procedural standard of effective enforcement. The enforcement of human rights 
is conceptually distinct from their existence as binding norms.96 As the following 
subsection highlights, such a misconception could shed light upon the emergence of Article 
47 as the undisputed star of the Charter across the different sets of statistics presented 
earlier. 
 
D.  A Right without a Remedy Is No Right at All; or Is It?  
 
Ubi jus ibi remedium. When there is a right, there is a remedy. How could the courts, as 
Lord Denning had once put it, see an injustice and yet ‘stand idly by’?97  
 
The purpose of this subsection is not to argue that the right to an effective remedy is 
materially over-protected in EU law, which continues to present important challenges 
regarding effective judicial protection in certain fields.98 And there are no doubt many 
important, practical reasons why the right to an effective remedy and the rights of defence 
are so often brought up in proceedings before the Court, compared to other provisions.99 
Nevertheless, this section does suggest that there may be a downside to the prominence of 
Article 47 CFR in the case law, which was so clearly highlighted in the numerical data as 
the first port of call in the protection of fundamental rights in the EU. Both a vision of rights 
as strongly associated with effective enforcement, discussed in subsection C above, and the 
lack of definition of the content of rights through the use of balancing discourse, discussed 
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in subsection B, can be considered as largely coextensive with a resulting emphasis on 
process-based rights, such as Article 47.  
The recognition of the right to an effective remedy in Article 47 enshrines an idea, already 
expressed several years back, that rights arising from EU law should be effectively 
protected at the national level, resulting in a set of corresponding obligations on national 
courts.100 For this reason, it has been argued that Article 47 sets a standard that is 
‘composite, coherent, and autonomous,’101 premised on the idea that the EU gives rise to a 
‘complete system of legal remedies.’102 On the one hand, each member State legal system 
contributes to effective judicial protection in the EU103 - a continuation of the notion of 
national procedural autonomy.104 On the other, national procedures, checked for 
effectiveness and equivalence by Article 47, ‘add flesh to the skeleton of primacy, direct 
effect and state liability’.105 Nevertheless, Arnull is right to query whether, in light of the 
fact that the principle of effective judicial protection had in itself previously enjoyed direct 
effect, this might cause ‘renewed activism on the part of the Court’ through the fiat of 
Article 47, rather than mere checks on effectiveness and equivalence.106 Indeed, in line with 
a charge of manipulation of rights for other purposes, the continuing references to Article 
47 of the Charter are suspicious when considering how this provision is used in conjunction 
with other rights. There, questions can be raised about the extent to which the case law 
accommodates appropriately the needs of the substantive provisions of the Charter as ends 
in their own right, rather than building them into a separate, general obligation to protect 
all rights arising from EU law effectively, uniformly and in line with the primacy principle.  
One of the most significant recent cases that displays a potential overuse of Article 47 is 
Egenberger, where Article 47 was used in addition to Article 21 in a case concerning 
discrimination against a non-believer applicant for a job with the Evangelical Church in 
Germany.107 It is noteworthy that, in Egenberger, the Bundesarbeitsgericht had asked a 
series of questions about the role of religion within the Framework Equality Directive 
2000/78 and, more specifically, about whether subscribing to a particular religion could 
constitute a genuine occupational requirement.108 The Court of Justice raised Article 47 of 
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its own motion (albeit that the provision had been mentioned by Advocate General Tanchev 
in his Opinion).109 It found: 
Article 47 of the Charter, which applies to a dispute such as that in the main 
proceedings, given that the AGG implements Directive 2000/78 in German law for 
the purposes of Article 51(1) of the Charter and that the dispute concerns a person 
who was the subject of a difference of treatment on grounds of religion in 
connection with access to employment, lays down the right of individuals to 
effective judicial protection of their rights under EU law.110 
The Court went on to decide that, in circumstances where Article 47 was applicable, the 
provision was invocable ‘as such’111 and required the availability of full judicial protection 
and the meaningful observance of both applicable provisions of the Charter – non-
discrimination and the right to an effective remedy.112 Finally, in line with the 
Mangold/Küçükdeveci principle,  
a national court hearing a dispute between two individuals is obliged, where it is 
not possible for it to interpret the applicable national law in conformity with 
Article 4(2) of Directive 2000/78, to ensure within its jurisdiction the judicial 
protection deriving for individuals from Articles 21 and 47 of the Charter and to 
guarantee the full effectiveness of those articles by disapplying if need be any 
contrary provision of national law.113 
Whether one agrees with the outcome of the case or not, Egenberger forms part of a series 
of rulings over the last couple of years that have made leaps in terms of methodologically 
clarifying Mangold.114 One can only wonder, though: in an area so directly occupied by 
Article 21 of the Charter – and indeed by Article 10 thereof (the freedom of thought, 
conscience, and religion), to which the Court does not refer – what does Article 47 add to 
the Court’s analysis and why was reference to that right essential?115 
As a matter of human rights law, procedural rights display significant differences to other 
provisions as they are ‘normatively defensible only by reference to a complete elaboration 
of the substantive rights at stake when [they] are invoked.’116 Indeed, whilst effective 
judicial protection is an essential facet of human rights law, as the ECtHR has highlighted, 
it is a supplementary provision that addresses non-rectification of violations of other rights 
due to a lack of appropriate and transparent legal processes.117 In turn, the adjudication of 
procedural rights engenders important difficulties for courts: used too little, and known 
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violations of rights can end up under-remedied. Used too much, and remedial issues can 
end up detracting from the normative questions inherent in the interpretation of substantive 
rights, such as – but not limited to – the reach of non-discrimination or of unfair 
employment practices. Such a pitfall is evident in the Egenberger ruling. The substantive 
problem with a rule that discriminates against non-believers is the discrimination against 
non-believers. It is not, at least in the first instance, the question of effective judicial 
protection, of which the preliminary reference itself is a generally positive indicator. Of 
course, once a finding is made in respect of the existence of a breach of a substantive right, 
such as non-discrimination, one could see the relevance of Article 47, provided the failure 
to protect the right is compounded by an absence of the possibility of obtaining redress for 
an established discriminatory practice. However, the existence of a link with EU law 
through a substantive right is not a sufficient reason to engage Article 47, in the absence of 
an analysis of the relevant procedures against which effectiveness of remedial measures is 
judged.  
Egenberger is not an isolated ruling.  Another example of such a use of Article 47 is Fuß, 
a case where a firefighter was forcibly transferred to an operational role when he requested 
that his working hours comply with the requirements of the Working Time Directive. 
There, the Court found a violation of Article 47 of the Charter due to the lack of dissuasive 
penalties for the employer making the transfer, but not a breach of Article 31 of the Charter, 
which protects the right to fair and just working conditions. The Court noted that ‘fear of 
such a reprisal measure, where no legal remedy is available against it, might deter workers 
who considered themselves the victims of a measure taken by their employer from pursuing 
their claims by judicial process, and would consequently be liable seriously to jeopardise 
implementation of the aim pursued by the directive.’118 This is undoubtedly correct, when 
looking at the effective protection of maximum working hours. If, however, it is not also 
(if not solely) a breach of Article 31 of the Charter, where do the protective functions of 
this provision (i.e. the obligation adequately to legislate for it) lie?  
The cogency of the Court’s approach is further undermined by the fact that, whereas Article 
47 is built into parts of the case law such as the ones discussed above, this is not always the 
case. For example, in Smith, a case which concerned the implementation of EU law on 
consumer protection in the field of insurance policies, the Court did not refer to Article 47, 
as it had done in Egenberger or Fuß.119 Rather, in that case, the Court affirmed the non-
horizontality of directives and fell back on state liability in damages under the Francovich 
rule.120 The same was true of Association de Médiation Sociale, discussed earlier, where 
the Court did not accompany its finding that Article 27 of the Charter was not invokable as 
such with a finding that this right must nevertheless be effectively protected in line with 
Article 47, rather than with the conditions of state liability under Francovich.121 That is not 
to say that Article 47 should have been used in these cases. However, if it is, as Egenberger 
suggests, relevant in all cases of implementation of EU law in line with the case law on 
Article 51, finding a coherent way of reconciling these rulings appears especially difficult.  
As Safjan and Düsterhaus convincingly argue, Article 47 is being interpreted by the Court 
as entailing a positive obligation on the part of the Member States to legislate for the 
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protection of fundamental rights.122 Factually, this might explain why Article 47 does not 
feature as prominently in areas involving more nebulous provisions aiming to a ‘high level 
of consumer protection’ in Union policies, such as Article 38 CFR, or provisions that refer 
to national laws and practices, such as Article 27. Conceptually, however, it demonstrates 
that the significance of Article 47 might entail a broader failure to recognise that protective 
duties to ensure the application of fundamental rights within the scope of EU law attach to 
all Charter provisions (i.e. even without the need to employ Article 47), as well as to 
develop a clear system of sanctions for the legislative and remedial failures of the Member 
States. Indeed, in parallel to Reich’s critique of the absence of a meaningful doctrine of 
civil liability in EU law – what he called the ‘paradox of “rights without duties”’123, one 
could similarly query EU law’s restricted notion of state liability as a public law remedy 
(one which, in its current iteration, does not always work well for fundamental rights, where 
the damage suffered is not necessarily pecuniary).124 Unfortunately, this taints Article 47 
with a panacea-like character, which can run against important problems of inflation, as 
well as raising questions about whether the substantive provisions are, rather ironically, 
effectively protected. Similarly, the Court’s approach towards Article 47 risks 
insufficiently accommodating the character of the right to an effective remedy itself, as a 
human right ‘deriving from a primary substantive right that has been breached.’125  
Of course, it should not be ignored that, in contrast with other constructions of procedural 
rights,126 the Charter right to an effective remedy is expressly linked to a value enshrined 
in one of the Charter’s titles (Justice) and carries heavy positive dimensions (e.g. legal aid), 
which indicate that it sets a high threshold, once engaged. It could, therefore, end up 
exceeding other standards of effective judicial protection such as Articles 6 and 13 of the 
Convention.127 While those standards already require, as Gerards and Glas point out, 
independent, flexible, transparent, and timely procedures, developed based on the principle 
of legal certainty,128 they do not include more specific stipulations along the lines of Article 
47. Nevertheless, even if the Union standard of Article 47 reaches beyond other comparable 
provisions, an understanding of the EU’s conception of effective judicial protection as 
something other and different, rather than building upon existing human rights norms, 
should not be celebrated. There is a difference between saying that lack of procedural 
fairness can ‘modify substance and can render that substance unconstitutional’129 and 
inflating the concept of a procedural right to encompass substantive choices pertaining to 
the application of other rights.  
Overall, whereas the fundamental rights protected by EU law must be effectively rendered 
at national level, the Court’s building of Article 47 into the analysis of other provisions 
suggests the supersession of the core remedial function of EU law (state liability in 
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damages) because indirect effect and, failing that, direct effect apply, in both public and 
private disputes, through the use of Article 47. This is so without appeal to any obvious test 
as to how and when Article 47 is added to other rights claims within the scope of EU law. 
Thus, while EU lawyers have rightly criticised the complexity of this field, which could be 
reduced if Article 47 in fact gave rise to a fully harmonised law of remedies at the EU 
level,130 it would be highly problematic if such a development emerged on the back of 
existing case law. Chantal Mak is thus correct in pointing out that ‘clarification is needed’ 
in respect of a number of aspects of the operation of Article 47 and, particularly, of the 
continued value of pre-existing rules on national procedural autonomy131 and the 
relationship between Article 47 with direct and indirect effect and state liability.132  
E. Interim Conclusion: The Need for a Break from Pre-Lisbon Case Law  
The foregoing analysis has shown, firstly, that the Court has succeeded in overcoming 
certain aspects of the fundamental rights critiques often levied against the Union. In light 
of the clarity with which general questions concerning the Charter’s scope and field of 
application have been treated, this instrument can be seen as playing a positive role in 
solidifying the role of fundamental rights in the EU as self-standing constitutional 
commitments. Yet, at the same time, in interpreting the Charter’s distinct provisions, as 
well as their general limitations, structure, and implications, the Court’s insistence upon 
continuity with the pre-Lisbon case law can be seen as restricting the reflexive development 
of fundamental rights as constitutional norms in the Union qua polity and continues to raise 
questions about its ability to protect all rights equally. Left unchallenged, the internal logic 
of this case law is problematic as a basis for further developing the Charter, as it foregoes 
a difficult but necessary transformation of the transactional forms of corrective justice 
underlying the Union’s initially private law model of integration into a constitutional order 
premised on a variety of shared values with a public (and not just intersubjective and 
individualistic) character.133  
Indeed, critiques such as the instrumentalisation of fundamental rights to achieve the 
primacy, effectiveness and uniformity of EU law and its marginal positive justification of 
rights by reference to the values that underpin them, still ring true of judgments relating to 
the Charter in its binding dimension, confirming what the numerical analysis had already 
suggested: that, albeit laying constitutionally strong foundations for the Charter in 
principle, the case law offers a fragmentary treatment of the Charter’s substantive 
provisions. That is so, insofar the structure of fundamental rights that the Court employs 
today continues to rest upon aspects of early case law not neatly transposable to the field 
of fundamental rights and, most notably, to the ‘vigilance of individuals seeking to assert 
their rights’ and the quest for a balance between the Union’s ‘double aim, at once economic 
and social’. An overuse of Article 47 and an underuse of social rights and civil liberties 
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could, in turn, be attributed to these features of EU rights protection, which naturally 
include unconditional rights within the invocability formula and strive to offer them 
effective protection through the procedural means of an effective remedy – yet without 
exhausting all of the positive/protective aspects that attach to their substantive protection. 
Similarly, these features can be taken to explain why the Union struggles to find a place for 
rights that are more vaguely phrased, legislatively more demanding and, crucially, not 
easily justifiable by reference to the often vacuous ‘balance’ between the different demands 
of a social market economy. 
A need more clearly to delineate the nature of the obligations protected by the Charter and 
to identify their addressees thus emerge as the key stumbling blocks of a constitutionally 
cogent understanding of fundamental rights under the Charter post-Lisbon. They set up a 
difficult task because they require a break from existing case law that presents the 
effectiveness of the Union’s constitutional machinery as one and the same with its 
enforcement134 and a vision of the realisation of rights that is more attuned to their changing 
constitutional functions within the Union. They entail, in other words, an understanding of 
rights based not on the need for a ‘fair balance’ between competing individual interests in 
market integration, but on a self-standing conception of the common good.135  
IV. Fundamental Rights under the Charter as Tripartite, Adequately 
Attributed, and Incommensurable 
How, one might ask, could the break with past visions of rights that the above section has 
called for be shown in rulings relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, going 
forward? And how could legal certainty and coherence – core aspects of the critique of the 
case law developed earlier – be served, if radical shifts were to take place in the protection 
of fundamental rights in the EU under the Charter? Provided they are understood as part of 
a holistic view of rights, rather than through a sectional perspective on rights as autonomous 
EU constructs, three settled tenets of human rights theory could, in the author’s view, assist 
with bringing about a self-standing fundamental rights jurisprudence for the Charter in the 
years to come. These are: the tripartite typology of human rights; the delineation of state 
and non-state duties to protect fundamental rights through the development of a principle 
of attribution distinct from direct effect; and the incommensurability of fundamental rights 
with respect to other interests.  
A. Tripartite Typology 
The quest for a conception of all rights as worthy of protection ‘globally in a fair and equal 
manner, on the same footing, and with the same emphasis’, albeit not having materialised 
at the international level, has been supported by the United Nations for the past twenty-five 
years.136 In adopting the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action on 25 June 1993, 
the World Conference of Human Rights and, shortly afterwards, the UN General Assembly, 
clearly asserted that ‘human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and 
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interrelated.’137 In turn, the most significant implication of this statement has been the 
adoption of a singular, tripartite typology of obligations to respect, protect and fulfil all 
rights, including economic, social and cultural rights:138 
Like civil and political rights, economic, social and cultural rights impose three 
different types of obligations on States: the obligations to respect, protect and fulfil. 
Failure to perform any one of these three obligations constitutes a violation of such 
rights. The obligation to respect requires States to refrain from interfering with the 
enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights. Thus, the right to housing is 
violated if the State engages in arbitrary forced evictions. The obligation to protect 
requires States to prevent violations of such rights by third parties. Thus, the failure 
to ensure that private employers comply with basic labour standards may amount 
to a violation of the right to work or the right to just and favourable conditions of 
work. The obligation to fulfil requires States to take appropriate legislative, 
administrative, budgetary, judicial and other measures towards the full realization 
of such rights. Thus, the failure of States to provide essential primary health care to 
those in need may amount to a violation.139 
This typology, initially coined by Shue,140 is generally considered an adequate substitution 
for the positive/negative dichotomy whereby economic, social and cultural rights had been 
seen as merely programmatic, aspirational and not justiciable.141 The typology was 
intended to highlight that all rights have positive and negative dimensions. For example, 
the state is required to police demonstrators to ensure the right to freedom of association is 
not hindered by counter-demonstrators.142 The duty to fulfil requires active steps to 
promote rights, such as by encouraging diversified ownership of the media.143 Indeed, it is 
now clear that ‘civil and political rights may also encompass “positive”, costly elements, 
and that these rights are also to some extent subject to progressive realisation.’144 The 
procedural rights discussed in section III above, for instance, such as the right to a fair trial 
and to an effective remedy, are good examples of the former type, insofar as they 
necessitate the building of appropriate institutions. And economic, social and cultural rights 
may also have elements ‘of a “negative”, cost-free character’ so that they are capable of 
immediate, rather than progressive, realisation.145  
 
Of course, this is not to say that the tripartite typology is capable in itself of filling in the 
gaps of what amounts to the core of different fundamental rights. Particularly when it 
comes to the most contentious part of the typology, that of positive duties to fulfil rights, 
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the minimum level below which the realisation of rights should not fall is not always 
clear.146 Moreover, a variety of potential priorities and sub-distinctions may be made within 
this model that, whilst not resulting in a hierarchy of rights, influence the pace with which 
different fundamental rights may be protected. In Basic rights, for instance, Shue himself 
argues that subsistence and security (as basic rights) must take precedence over other 
rights,147 for no other rights can be realised without them. Similarly, it may be thought that 
rights associated with self-actualisation rank lower as implementing priorities than 
physiological or safety needs.148 As such, a meaningful analysis of human rights at the EU 
level could not stop merely at recognising that fundamental rights give rise to threefold 
duties. It must also entail a discussion of  what these duties mean as a matter of ‘core 
content’149, who should be responsible for providing them (further discussed under ‘B. 
Attribution’) and how they should be applied within a democratic society (further discussed 
under ‘C. Incommensurability’).  As De Schutter points out, the respect‐protect‐fulfil 
typology should thus only be seen as a basic ‘grid of analysis’150  within which to embed 
minimum thresholds151 of what the realisation of fundamental rights requires in more 
substantive terms.  
 
In turn, organising the discussion of the essential content of rights around these threefold 
obligations could be an especially useful tool for rebuilding the Union’s judicial apparatus 
in a manner that is more aptly transposable to all human rights. But what would the need 
for positive fulfilment look like in a Union where discrepancies in the available resources 
of Member States render the setting of minimum standards especially difficult and where, 
as noted in subsection III.B above, conditionality upon national laws and practices reduces 
the Court’s possibility of imposing positive duties in respect of certain rights? The South 
African Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence on social rights and, most notably, its ruling 
in Grootboom, a case which concerned the effectiveness of the South African government’s 
post-apartheid housing programme, offers a useful illustration of the adjudication of this 
fulfilment function.152 In that case, the South African government had not interfered with 
the right to housing (the respect element of the right) and legislation was in place to give 
effect to it (the protective aspect of the right). It was the deployment of the South African 
government’s policy of building housing for the poor (the fulfilment function) that was 
challenged before the Court. The latter acknowledged both that it could not impose on 
government the obligation immediately to build all required accommodation, i.e. that there 
may be implementing priorities even within the delivery of this right, and that the minimum 
housing thresholds, i.e. what type of housing is made available, could vary. It found:  
 
The state’s obligation to provide access to adequate housing depends on context, 
and may differ from province to province, from city to city, from rural to urban 
areas and from person to person. Some may need access to land and no more; some 
may need access to land and building materials; some may need access to finance; 
some may need access to services such as water, sewage, electricity and roads. What 
might be appropriate in a rural area where people live together in communities 
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engaging in subsistence farming may not be appropriate in an urban area where 
people are looking for employment and a place to live.153 
 
The right to housing thus did not entitle an individual ‘to claim shelter or housing 
immediately upon demand.’154 Nevertheless, in ultimately finding in favour of the 
applicants, the South African Constitutional Court noted that it was under an obligation to 
assess whether ‘a coherent, co-ordinated programme designed to meet’  the obligation to 
provide housing had been implemented.155 In the circumstances, the application of the 
South African government’s promulgated programme could not be accepted as expressing 
a reasonable allocation of state resources devoted to the purpose of providing housing for 
all, insofar as it ‘failed to provide for any form of relief to those desperately in need of 
access to housing’ in the Cape region.156  
 
At this juncture, it is worth trying to anticipate a possible critique of the typology proposed 
in this section, namely that such a framework sets us up for an overly wide-ranging 
application of human rights. For some, this could be perceived as a danger to the normative 
priority of human rights, because it is over-inclusive.157 For others, such a framework may 
signal a broader discomfort with a perceived direction towards a so-called ‘human rights 
fundamentalism’ which attacks, rather than safeguarding, a society made up of plural, 
autonomous choices.158 However, while it is certainly true that the interpretation of the core 
content of rights and, even, the labelling of a broad set of rights as ‘fundamental’ within 
the Charter may give rise to such critiques, not all aspects of the human rights framework 
proposed in this sub-section justify this dissonance. For example, even if one were to reject 
the thicker conception of indivisible rights that gave rise to the assumption of the tripartite 
typology,159 as a ‘grid of analysis’160 the typology can still be useful as a structural premise 
of human rights reasoning.  
 
Crucially, as the judgment of the South African Court highlights, the typology does not 
suggest that fundamental rights should be invoked as if they gave rise to particular 
outcomes or prerogatives against all likely incursions by all actors. Article 21 of the Charter 
(non-discrimination) need not impose a ban on all age-restricted private gatherings. Article 
15 (the right to work) need not be read as a right to a job for everyone that wants one. And 
Article 26 of the Charter (the inclusion of persons with disabilities) need not be seen as 
creating an immediate claim to facilities that accommodate every disability near every 
person’s home. We are bound to continue to disagree both about the interpretive reach of 
fundamental rights and about which rights are worth including in a fundamental rights 
catalogue. However, the typology could help to change the immediate link that EU law 
presently draws between the enforceability of Charter rights and their effective realisation. 
The fact that fundamental rights might not give rise to certain claims of fulfilment, for 
instance, does not mean that they also should not give rise to any claims of protection or 
respect for disability, work, or housing, or that these rights do not give rise to any fulfilment 
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duties for actors responsible for their realisation.161 The clearer carving out of a fulfilment 
function within the content of different human rights obligations could indeed be a 
significant improvement on the current system of fundamental rights protection in the 
Union, where this dimension emerges predominantly, as shown in subsection III.C above, 
by way of an overuse of the right to an effective remedy.  
 
It follows that the idea of fulfilment of rights should not be seen in terms of maximum 
harmonisation of standards or the stipulation of specific policies by the Court of Justice 
but, rather, as an assessment of the existing measures taken to fulfil rights by reference to 
the normative demands of the substantive provisions themselves and, in their absence, the 
attribution of appropriate remedies (which can, of course, then be assessed for effectiveness 
under the tab of Article 47). Similarly, while the less-than-satisfactory exclusion of positive 
duties for provisions deemed to be ‘principles’ in the text of Article 52(5) CFR would 
persist despite the employment of a tripartite conception of rights, an approach that more 
clearly shows where the relevant obligations fall within the respect, protect, fulfil spectrum 
could be a way of giving effect to ‘principles’, albeit in the more limited manner envisaged 
in the Charter’s text. While the exclusion of positive fulfilment for provisions labelled as 
principles would remain problematic when seen through the prism of indivisibility, an 
approach supporting at least duties to respect and protect rights as part of the legislative 
function of the Union would be compatible with the wording of Article 52(5) for all 
provisions of the Charter.162 It would, in turn, challenge the notion that those rights (or 
principles?) which are not invocable as such do not give rise to any justiciable claims at all. 
For example, this approach could have structured more coherently the Court’s reasoning in 
cases like Association de Médiation Sociale. There, it would have rendered more 
meaningful any fallback claims for damages against the state, by building them into the 
core of an obligation to protect against breaches of the right by private actors in situations 
falling within the scope of EU law, rather than by relying on the – in that case unlikely – 
Francovich formula.163 This would not only offer more hopeful prospects to future 
claimants, but it would also clarify the schema of obligations associated with different 
dimensions of the protected right for national courts. 
 
Moreover, the mode of reasoning advocated above is not entirely foreign to the Court of 
Justice’s own past practice in certain fields and, particularly, that of environmental 
protection. An analogous approach can, for example, be seen in the Janecek and 
ClientEarth judgments.164 There, the Court found, firstly, that individuals ‘must be in a 
position to require the competent national authorities to draw up an action plan’ to fight 
pollution.165 Secondly, the content of the action plan must be subject to judicial review in 
respect of its ability to contain pollution below certain thresholds, even though it remains 
for the Member States to determine the specific parameters of their policies by taking 
account of the various interests at stake in their application.166 The problem is thus not 
necessarily the unavailability of fulfilment reasoning altogether in the Court’s interpretive 
toolbox, but the fact that the obligations that are created thereby are not explicitly related 
to provisions of the Charter, such as the principle of environmental protection enshrined in 
Article 37 CFR (and further expressed in secondary legislation) – a problem which persists 
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in more recent case law reaffirming the above findings, such as Craeynest.167 In this 
respect, unlike the strong link drawn between the human rights obligations protected in the 
Bill of Rights in the South African Constitutional Court’s approach, the Court of Justice’s 
analysis allows the secondary legislation, rather than the Charter, to determine the reach of 
judicial scrutiny over questions pertaining to fundamental rights. Recognising these 
similarities in logic by including in EU case law an analysis of the core content of the 
Charter’s provisions alongside any discussion of the applicable secondary legislation, 
would ensure that the constitutional status of all of the Charter’s provisions is more 
coherently represented, as well as more clearly showing in which ways these provisions 
ought to be respected, protected, or fulfilled.  
B. Attribution 
Hand in hand with the question of what the minimum obligations to observe human rights 
are, goes the question of who is responsible (on a legal rather than a moral level) for 
delivering them. To acquire meaningful legal force, human rights must be adequately 
attributed to a plausible set of right-holders and duty-bearers.168 As Onora O’Neill has put 
it, ‘it would be absurd to claim that everyone has an obligation to provide a morsel of food 
or a fraction of an income to each deprived person. Goods and services have to be rendered 
by particular persons or institutions to some others.’169 However trite or obvious these 
remarks might seem, it follows from the foregoing analysis that by associating fundamental 
rights with means of effective enforcement and, particularly, with the direct effect formula, 
EU law struggles to attribute fundamental rights to specific duty-bearers, while it assumes 
that all those with an interest in the application of the Charter also have a valid right to it.  
Indeed, the extensive reliance on rights such as Article 47 and provisions invokable ‘as 
such’ and, by the same token, the generally restrictive interpretation of rights that are not 
phrased in a manner deemed sufficiently clear, precise, and unconditional so as to be so 
invoked, stem from a conception of direct effect as not just the key but, indeed, as the only 
principle of attribution within EU law. Once the relevant conditions for direct effect are 
met, duties are quasi-automatically attributed to those against whom the obligations are 
claimed. Occasional (and often re-amended) exceptions, such as the non-horizontality of 
directives, appear only to confirm this basic principle. Of course, it must be acknowledged 
that the Court has already started moving towards a more principled account of the 
application of fundamental rights, by placing greater emphasis on the role of national  
courts through consistent interpretation, than on the conditions for direct effect.170 
Nevertheless, such an approach still retains the direct effect of EU law as a guide, relying 
on it whenever consistent interpretation does not suffice.  
This schema is problematic. As Craig rightly points out, while the Charter is ‘not literally 
freestanding and presupposes some lock onto EU law in order to apply’,171 it is clear from 
judgments such as Fransson that it is already, in one sense, invocable as an interpretive 
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tool of EU law in all areas that fall within its scope. Thus, seen qua mere invocability,172 
direct effect appears obsolete since all rights give rise to some interpretive duties on courts, 
regardless of their ability to meet the direct effect conditions. Equally, seen as a means of 
enforcing rights (as the case law on Article 47 has highlighted), direct effect is irrelevant 
from the perspective of securing better constitutional protection of the core content of 
different provisions of the Charter, as it remains justifiable largely by rationales of primacy 
and effectiveness achievable through private enforcement.173  
In turn, while the operation of rights in the Union to date has been capable of comprising a 
wide range of actors as both right-holders and duty-bearers,174 which has certain benefits 
for the protection of human rights (e.g. in the field of horizontal application), it can be seen 
as unduly reductionist in two respects. First, the continued reliance on the direct/indirect 
effect framework is unresponsive to the purposes for which human rights are held. 
Attribution to particular actors has a clear impact on minimum standards of protection, as 
it can reduce limitations to fundamental rights created by the rights of others. For example, 
such a principle might have changed the outcome of headscarf cases such as Achbita, where 
the Court’s analysis of the rights of others effectively comprised a right to a specific 
corporate image.175 The foundation of this analysis in human rights law is not clear and can 
be contrasted with the much more limited accommodation of corporate rights in the 
Convention framework,176  where they are served insofar they play a role in the democratic 
public sphere that fundamental rights set up (the ECtHR recognises, e.g., the need for 
freedom of expression for the press).177 Secondly, a more detailed principle of attribution 
beyond direct effect could have altered the bearing of rulings such as Egenberger, where it 
is unclear, as discussed earlier, why the reliance upon procedural rights (e.g. an effective 
remedy) should be directed against the private actors breaching the substantive provisions 
(non-discrimination), rather than the state. While it is indeed compatible with the Charter’s 
text and context178 as well as with human rights theory that certain rights should create 
obligations for a range of actors beyond states,179 that does not mean that they create the 
same obligations for all of these actors or that they do so for the same reasons.  
It follows that, rather than seeing the individual as at once a subject and an object of EU 
integration,180 the Charter requires a different principle of attribution – one which 
recognises that direct effect is just a way of invoking rights, and not necessarily the best 
legal representation of ‘responsibilities and duties with regard to other persons, to the 
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human community and to future generations’, as proclaimed in the Charter’s Preamble. 
Combined with an understanding of all rights as entailing positive and negative elements, 
developing duties to observe human rights as requiring protection for and against specified 
actors depends both on the normative content of a human right and on the dynamics of the 
legal relationship within which that right is invoked, rather than being based solely on the 
nature of the obligation as invocable ‘as such.’181 In turn, acknowledging that direct effect 
is an inadequate way of ensuring that fundamental rights and obligations attach to the 
appropriate actors – i.e. those with a valid claim to the rights on the one hand and those 
who are capable of securing respect for fundamental rights within and beyond the 
individual case, on the other182 – could help in structurally embedding standards for the 
protection of fundamental rights within EU law more consciously and less casuistically.  
C. Incommensurability  
If the attribution of fundamental rights to specific right-holders and duty-bearers depends 
on reasons for the protection of fundamental rights compatible with the Charter’s 
understanding of the Union as a constitutional polity broader than the market, then the 
adjudication of those rights must, similarly, evolve away from market constitutionalism.183 
Such an argument does not result from the idea that all aspects of the Treaties have a 
constitutional status, taken in its initial context, but because today that parity of status 
prevents rights from assuming protection for positive reasons related to their content, rather 
than in relation to the potential restrictions they may create for other aspects of EU primary 
law.184  
 
Indeed, as noted earlier on, the quest for a fair balance between social and economic Union 
interests rewrites the balancing exercises already inherent in the adjudication of the 
Charter’s provisions. As section III.B has highlighted, the Charter itself expresses the need 
for a balanced approach to rights (rather than balancing between the two goals mentioned 
above) by defining specific limitations for some of its provisions through conditionality on 
pre-existing ‘national laws and practices’ as well as through the general limitations clause 
in Article 52(1). Emphasising a further need for a fair balance thus overshadows the 
Charter’s attempt to identify its own justificatory apparatus, which its distinct sets of 
provisions reflect.185 In proclaiming the indivisibility of a defined set of values through its 
thematic sets of provisions in particular, it may be argued that the Charter does not only 
seek to overcome the inferior status of the social rights embedded therein but also – if 
indeed not primarily – to express the need for rights to contribute to an overarching and 
non-abrogable system of values not just built for a social market economy but, rather, as 
the Charter’s Preamble proclaims, for a democracy subject to the rule of law.  
 
In such a context, rights cannot be meaningfully expressed in competition with other norms 
or split into economic, individual, or private autonomy-inducing elements on the one hand 
and participatory, collective, social or public-autonomy-manifesting elements on the other. 
That is not to say that rights cannot be defined with sensitivity to a multitude of 
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considerations or that they cannot be readjusted in the public sphere over time.186 However, 
as Zürn reconstructs Habermas’s famous argument, balancing is at odds with the character 
of fundamental rights as legal claims that ‘may not be treated as merely one among other 
competing goods to be weighed and transitively ordered on a case-by-case basis.’187 These 
rights have a ‘transsubjective’188 character, in that they amount to more than the sum of 
their outcomes: they at once support and are necessitated by the democratic process and it 
is in that process alone, as requiring an irreducible conception of freedom through both 
private and public autonomy, that they can achieve their interpretive potential. The 
incommensurability of rights with respect to other interests is thus a side-effect of the 
mutual presupposition between fundamental rights and democracy: rights attaching to basic 
subsistence (such as environmental justice and minimum welfare); freedoms (to 
entrepreneurial activity or to be free of government interference); and participation (such 
as the right to vote) are all in equal parts essential for making reasoned democratic decision-
making possible.189 
 
It follows that the need for a ‘break’ with prior case law suggested earlier need not be taken 
to mean that the Court should rely on legally uncertain or as yet unidentified principles of 
interpretation but, rather, that the adjudication of constitutional norms entails reasonable 
justifications for the interpretation of rights, rather than merely an application of past case 
law.190 In this regard, defining the core content of rights by reference to the values – not 
rigid and metaphysical but explicit and politically agreed – which are expressed in the 
Charter’s distinct titles, read in the light of the Charter’s aspiration of democratic decision-
making, can be a more convincing justificatory starting point than the idea of a ‘fair 
balance’ between the economic and social goals of the single market. 
 
D. Interim Conclusion: A System for Protecting Fundamental Rights under the 
Charter 
 
This section has proposed a system for protecting fundamental rights under the Charter 
through the recognition of: a. the tripartite typology of human rights; b. a principle of 
attribution of rights based both on the content of rights and on the relational dynamics that 
distinguish mere private power (sanctionable through civil law and its remedies) from 
public or political power (sanctionable through constitutional law and its remedies), and c. 
that fundamental rights are incommensurable as essential tenets of democracy and the rule 
of law, to which the Charter explicitly aspires. While each of these elements is significant 
in its own right, however, it should be borne in mind that they are not strictly 
distinguishable into compartments or possible to implement one by one in practice. Rather, 
their meaningfulness depends on a comprehensive system of rights protection that 
accommodates these dimensions alongside each other. Furthermore, it is not suggested that 
these three proposed changes would result in a perfect framework for the protection of 
fundamental rights under the Charter – a Charter which, after all, can itself be criticised for 
poor drafting, limited follow-through in its much-awaited innovations such as indivisibility 
                                                     
186 See further, for such an argument, R Alexy, ‘Balancing, Constitutional Review, and Representation’ 
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and, despite the appeal to popular authorship, unimpressive recognisability by EU 
citizens.191 Nevertheless, building these elements into the mounting case law on the Charter 
could offer a more coherent rendering of all rights, loyal both to their universal outlook and 
their politicising qualities. It could thus help with putting into practice the idea that 
fundamental rights are a tight network of interrelated, indivisible, and non-negotiable 
preconditions of the idea of ever-closer Union, within which the Charter emerged.  
 
V. Conclusion  
 
What distinguishes a successful bill of rights from a limited or unsuccessful one? 
Ultimately, one might argue, such an assessment can only rest upon the extent to which a 
bill of rights is used in practice, both in the sense of being invoked by right-holders before 
the courts and in being duly applied within the court system to appropriate duty-bearers 
with sufficient deterring effects. By using numerical indicators on the application of the 
Charter, cross-checked through a closer analysis of the ways in which the Court of Justice 
has altered its position vis-à-vis the protection of fundamental rights as a result of the 
Charter’s entry into force in a selection of cases, this paper has sought to show that the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights has been successful in respect of its symbolic, procedural, 
and individual-rights-affirming aspects; but that it has been less radical in delivering on its 
promise of protection of the different types of rights enshrined therein. 
 
More specifically, the analysis in both Section II and Section III highlighted that the case 
law over the ten years of the Charter’s binding existence shows significant elements of 
progress towards an understanding of fundamental rights as constitutional obligations 
stemming from a unitary source, compared to the Court’s earlier case law. Whilst no longer 
an ‘afterthought’192 for the Union, however, fundamental rights continue to display 
important limitations in terms of theoretical justification, due to a continued use of a 
misleading dialectic between the social and the market in the Charter era and to a view of 
rights as individually exercisable interests. This problem is manifested in the way and 
extent to which the Charter has been litigated, which shows a slower and much more 
diversified protection of provisions such as collective employment rights and freedoms. A 
lack of purposive justification is similarly evident in the embedding of positive duties into 
procedural rights and in a corresponding marginalisation of rights more vaguely or 
conditionally framed, resulting from a focus on direct effect or invocability of a right ‘as 
such’ – a focus which feeds a problematic assumption that rights that do not meet this test 
do not give rise to justiciable standards.  
 
It follows that, ten years after the attribution of binding effect to the Charter, the ‘federal 
question’193 this instrument had raised at the time of its proclamation has only in part been 
answered: on the one hand, the case law speaks of a Union qua polity insofar as the 
Charter’s field of application and the Court’s reliance upon it, as opposed to other sources 
of protection, have been consistent. On the other hand, the continuing propensity of the 
Court to translate market freedoms into rights,194 combined with a legalistic reliance on 
internal principles of adjudication stemming from the more hybrid private/public model of 
EU internal market law, loom over the Charter’s effectiveness as a binding constitutional 
instrument. In the author’s view, a more confident assumption of elements of human rights 
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law, including its tripartite conception of human rights obligations; a principle of attribution 
of these obligations beyond direct effect, and a conception of the core layers of fundamental 
rights as incommensurable with other goods, albeit subject to defined limitations, would be 
significant steps towards allowing a more confident, yet non-isolationist, human rights 
jurisprudence about the Charter to develop. It remains to be seen whether, in the next ten 
years of the Charter’s application, such steps could succeed in ensuring that no fundamental 
rights – and not just fundamental rights which are invocable ‘as such’ – become, to return 
to Advocate General Bot’s terminology, ‘a mere entreaty.’195 
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